From a31fe44e7549912d05753c7f686ebbd29aea9cee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Holden Rohrer Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2020 11:06:34 -0400 Subject: federalist papers --- rich/07_federalist | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 130 insertions(+) create mode 100644 rich/07_federalist (limited to 'rich/07_federalist') diff --git a/rich/07_federalist b/rich/07_federalist new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a54f184 --- /dev/null +++ b/rich/07_federalist @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +Federalist #15 (p. 63--68) + +Political disunity -> danger +False arguments have led the people to astray. +It is widely agreed that the confederate government is weak, but +detractors of the federal system refuse to give it all its strength. +64 +Nationally humiliated +- The government cannot pay foreign or domestic debts +- There are still outposts of foreign enemies in rightful US territory + Like Mississippi river. +Ambassadors don't have any real power, so the US is a mockery abroad. +The Confederacy cannot call upon troops. +Land values have dropped because credit is not backed by a federal +treasury. +65 +Opponents of a federal system don't support giving it the powers that it +needs (treasury, raising troops, I think). + More generally, refuse to give the Union any power over the states +This lack of powers intrinsic to the Confederation has specific +structural issues. +The federal gov't cannot raise money or men, relying on the cooperation +of states and individuals (i.e. powerless). +"substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild +influence of the magistracy" +66 +Treaties with real ties have to have real sanctions, so if the States do +intend to stand in a protective alliance, in order to reduce infighting +and jealousy to the instability of the nation, there must be a central +government with + - the power to make and enforce laws (by coercion of the sword) + - the responsibility to the people rather than collective states +67 +But, in confederacy, military coercion means war while courts and the +magistrate have more power in a union. +Just assuming that these won't be needed is idealist because government +is required to restrain men. +The Confederacy allows power-seeking by states to succeed in stalling +the national government, when fast action is required to gain respect +68 +Under the confederation, concurrence of thirteen wills is requisite. +The government is failing because it isn't supported by its constituents + +Federalist #53 (p. 239--243) +(oops) + +Annual elections as a specific time frame for ensuring democracy is a +myth. +240 +But having exactly one period, as defined constitutionally, for an +election is necessary. +In Britain, parliament extended its own rule by four years---a precedent +dangerous to free government. +So a fixed election cycle is sufficient and necessary, but what election +cycle is most valuable? +241 +Annual elections maintain freedom, but biennial elections are more +effective. +Lawmakers require deep knowledge of the vast states, which is easier to +develop over the longer period of two years. +242 + +Federalist #51 (231--234) + +"The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and +Balances Between the Different Departments" + +The government's different chambers should be each drawn from the +people, but some deviation is acceptable. +The judiciary requires specific special qualifications and a permanent +term, making the executive and legislature most qualified to make those +initial choices. +232 +"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition" + Checks and balances are personal, power-oriented motives for each + branch to maintain their own power by reducing/checking the ambition + and power of the others. +"The private interests of every individual may be a sentinel over the +public rights." +Legislative is the strongest branch, so it's weakened with a bicameral +legislature. +But the power of executive > legislature isn't enough, so the +legislature must be motivated to support the executive (vetos?) +233 +State governments also protect against abuses of power on the federal +level, so the federal government must be sufficiently divided to +maintain this more local power ("double security"). +Basic rights should also be protected in the checks and balances / +constitutional system. +Tyranny of the majority is prevented by multiplicity of views at a +social level and the judicial system at an organizational level. +The *federal principle* maintains the *republican cause* + +1) According to Hamilton in Federalist #15, why is a strong central +government needed? Please explain your answer. + +Hamilton argues that the Confederacy's national government has so little +power as to make an international mockery of itself. Hamilton expects +the government to make and enforce laws with a national militia, be able +to conduct war/military action outside of its borders, naming a specific +target: "Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation +in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it." (64) +The idea that military intervention is the root of national power +follows through arguments towards collection of funds and of signing of +international treaties. Hamilton believes that the Articles of +Confederation make the US to be an international joke: "The imbecility +of our government even forbids them to treat with us." (64) Hamilton +argues that the way that this would be developed in a confederacy is by +the enforcement of war. The only way, if courts are laughable, to +control states is by leveraging tyranny: "nor would any prudent man +choose to commit his happiness to it." (67) + +2) Madison writes in Federalist #51, "Ambition must be made to +counteract ambition". What do you think this means and why does he make +this argument? + +Ambition is the personal/private interests of each branch and individual +in the government. He sees ambition as a search for power, which is +reasonable to expect. This essay, while spending much of its time +apologizing for where the government doesn't appear to be sufficiently +weakened (the executive selecting the judicial (232)). Madison also +develops the idea of self-defense of a department against the other +departments rather than just restriction, and the development of the +federal system to prevent an overall unjust government (the nation) from +opressing the people by a "double security." (232) Madison acknowledges that +these measures are often redundant but that the best way to ensure that +nothing gets through the cracks is this system. Finally, he declares +that the federal system prevents the tyranny of the majority by +preventing even the ambition of a majority group from oppressing a +minority. -- cgit