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Federalist #15 (p. 63--68)

Political disunity -> danger
False arguments have led the people to astray.
It is widely agreed that the confederate government is weak, but
detractors of the federal system refuse to give it all its strength.
64
Nationally humiliated
- The government cannot pay foreign or domestic debts
- There are still outposts of foreign enemies in rightful US territory
    Like Mississippi river.
Ambassadors don't have any real power, so the US is a mockery abroad.
The Confederacy cannot call upon troops.
Land values have dropped because credit is not backed by a federal
treasury.
65
Opponents of a federal system don't support giving it the powers that it
needs (treasury, raising troops, I think).
    More generally, refuse to give the Union any power over the states
This lack of powers intrinsic to the Confederation has specific
structural issues.
The federal gov't cannot raise money or men, relying on the cooperation
of states and individuals (i.e. powerless).
"substitute the violent and sanguinary agency of the sword to the mild
influence of the magistracy"
66
Treaties with real ties have to have real sanctions, so if the States do
intend to stand in a protective alliance, in order to reduce infighting
and jealousy to the instability of the nation, there must be a central
government with
    - the power to make and enforce laws (by coercion of the sword)
    - the responsibility to the people rather than collective states
67
But, in confederacy, military coercion means war while courts and the
magistrate have more power in a union.
Just assuming that these won't be needed is idealist because government
is required to restrain men.
The Confederacy allows power-seeking by states to succeed in stalling
the national government, when fast action is required to gain respect
68
Under the confederation, concurrence of thirteen wills is requisite.
The government is failing because it isn't supported by its constituents

Federalist #53 (p. 239--243)
(oops)

Annual elections as a specific time frame for ensuring democracy is a
myth.
240
But having exactly one period, as defined constitutionally, for an
election is necessary.
In Britain, parliament extended its own rule by four years---a precedent
dangerous to free government.
So a fixed election cycle is sufficient and necessary, but what election
cycle is most valuable?
241
Annual elections maintain freedom, but biennial elections are more
effective.
Lawmakers require deep knowledge of the vast states, which is easier to
develop over the longer period of two years.
242

Federalist #51 (231--234)

"The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Balances Between the Different Departments"

The government's different chambers should be each drawn from the
people, but some deviation is acceptable.
The judiciary requires specific special qualifications and a permanent
term, making the executive and legislature most qualified to make those
initial choices.
232
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition"
    Checks and balances are personal, power-oriented motives for each
    branch to maintain their own power by reducing/checking the ambition
    and power of the others.
"The private interests of every individual may be a sentinel over the
public rights."
Legislative is the strongest branch, so it's weakened with a bicameral
legislature.
But the power of executive > legislature isn't enough, so the
legislature must be motivated to support the executive (vetos?)
233
State governments also protect against abuses of power on the federal
level, so the federal government must be sufficiently divided to
maintain this more local power ("double security").
Basic rights should also be protected in the checks and balances /
constitutional system.
Tyranny of the majority is prevented by multiplicity of views at a
social level and the judicial system at an organizational level.
The *federal principle* maintains the *republican cause*

1) According to Hamilton in Federalist #15, why is a strong central
government needed? Please explain your answer. 

Hamilton argues that the Confederacy's national government has so little
power as to make an international mockery of itself. Hamilton expects
the government to make and enforce laws with a national militia, be able
to conduct war/military action outside of its borders, naming a specific
target: "Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation
in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it." (64)
The idea that military intervention is the root of national power
follows through arguments towards collection of funds and of signing of
international treaties. Hamilton believes that the Articles of
Confederation make the US to be an international joke: "The imbecility
of our government even forbids them to treat with us." (64) Hamilton
argues that the way that this would be developed in a confederacy is by
the enforcement of war. The only way, if courts are laughable, to
control states is by leveraging tyranny: "nor would any prudent man
choose to commit his happiness to it." (67)

2) Madison writes in Federalist #51, "Ambition must be made to
counteract ambition".  What do you think this means and why does he make
this argument?

Ambition is the personal/private interests of each branch and individual
in the government. He sees ambition as a search for power, which is
reasonable to expect. This essay, while spending much of its time
apologizing for where the government doesn't appear to be sufficiently
weakened (the executive selecting the judicial (232)). Madison also
develops the idea of self-defense of a department against the other
departments rather than just restriction, and the development of the
federal system to prevent an overall unjust government (the nation) from
opressing the people by a "double security." (232) Madison acknowledges that
these measures are often redundant but that the best way to ensure that
nothing gets through the cracks is this system. Finally, he declares
that the federal system prevents the tyranny of the majority by
preventing even the ambition of a majority group from oppressing a
minority.